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ABSTRACT 
This study analyzes the monetary policy transmission in India with the help of bank 
lending channel hypothesis. We test the shift in loan supply emanating from the  
changes in the prime policy rate used by the Reserve Bank of India. Using yearly bank 
balance sheet data from 1996 to 2007, the paper provides evidence of an operational 
BLC in India. Further, segregating banks by asset size and liquidity, we find that small, 
illiquid banks are more affected by policy changes, and the effect is more pronounced in 
areas of non-priority sector lending. Finally, the domestically owned banks are more 
sensitive to policy rate changes vis-à-vis foreign banks.  
                                                            
1 Professor at Madras School of Economics 
  1
1. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of monetary policy transmission has remained by and large elusive. Although 
most economists tend to agree that, at least in the short run, monetary policy can 
significantly influence the course of the real economy; the exact process of this 
transmission mechanism still remains a “black box” (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
Recent research has shown that accurately defining the role of banks in the transmission 
of monetary policy holds the key in explaining the effects of policy on the economy. 
Specifically, in the credit channel, banks are assumed to play a pivotal role in the 
transmission of policy. Assuming asymmetric information between lenders and 
borrowers, proponents of the credit channel offers an intuitive explanation for the 
strength, timing, and distributional effects of policy on the economy.  
 
A large body of literature over the last decade has examined the existence of the credit 
channel by further dividing it into two sub-channels that account for the role of banks 
in transmitting central bank impulses: the balance sheet channel and the bank lending 
channel (BLC). This paper provides evidence in support of the credit channel, in 
general, and the bank lending channel, in particular, from the perspective of an 
emerging economy, India. 
 
The bank lending channel of monetary transmission hypothesize that during a 
contractionary policy pursued by the central bank, there would be a substantial decline 
in the reservable deposit in the banking system due to higher reserved requirements on 
banks and the increased alternative cost of holding money. Therefore, if banks cannot 
replace the fall in loanable funds through liquidating assets or through external forms 
of finance, the contractionary policy will decrease their loan supply and, in turn the real 
spending of their borrowers. The existence of the bank lending channel  hypothesis 
critically hinges on two necessary assumptions: (a) some spending are dependent on 
bank lending and (b) monetary policy can affect supply of bank loans and the resulting 
decrease in loan supply reduces real aggregate spending (Kashyap & Stein 1995). 
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Typically, as the first assumption is likely to be empirically valid, most of the studies 
therefore focus on testing the latter assumption by examining whether monetary policy 
shift the supply of bank loan and these impacts are  if at all uniformly spread across all 
types of banks. 
  The testing of bank lending channel hypothesis has gained importance of 
late, due to the significant structural change witnessed by the Indian banking sector in 
both its working as well as its regulation. Prior to mid-eighties, India’s banking sector 
has been perceived to be excessively regulated and financially repressed. Though 
intervention in India has for long been justified on grounds of achieving the 
government’s development goals and achieving equitable growth, the long-drawn-out 
existence of excessively large public banks led to inefficient allocation of resources as 
well as concentration of power within a few banks. Over 90% of the assets and credit 
during 1991 lay within the control of 27 public-sector banks. 
 However, following the Chakravarthy Committee (1985) recommendations, the 
coupon rates on government bonds were gradually increased to reflect market 
conditions. More comprehensive reforms followed the Narasimham Committee report 
of 1991. The year 1991 saw India going through a balance of payment crisis following 
which, comprehensive reforms were initiated. The Narasimham Committee’s 
recommendations brought in prudential regulations and norms, a reduction in the CRR 
and SLR requirements, as well as interest rate and entry deregulation. In the following 
year, the Basel Accord capital adequacy standards were adopted. Therefore, in the 
liberalized regime the role of the RBI and its working through the monetary policy has 
gained increasing importance in India.  
  In this paper, we hypothesize that a contractionary policy pursued by RBI, 
through the prime policy rate (bank rate and repo rate) will reduce the loanable funds 
of banks and if banks cannot replace this fall without any cost by liquidating their assets 
or through external forms of finance, it would lead to a decrease in loan supply. 
 The empirical test for the existence of the BLC have been carried out for many 
economies, on a varying scale, both with respect to the methodology used as well as the 
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reasons and implications cited. While the earlier empirical studies mainly used time 
series techniques to study the bank loan models, the more recent researches tend to 
focus on individual bank behavior using panel data models. 
  Using aggregate level bank data for the US banking sector from 1959-1978, 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) concluded that the interest rate on Federal funds was a 
good indicator of future movement in real macroeconomic activity, and also of the 
monetary policy actions. Monetary policy was understood to work partly through 
credit and partly through deposits. Bernanke followed up this work with a paper with 
Gertler (1993), that tried to establish how exactly monetary policy exerts its influence on 
real output and spending. The paper looked into the credit channel as an interim 
between monetary policy actions and changes in the real economy, changes that are 
traditionally seen with a lagged response. In conclusion, the paper proposed that the lag 
was due to the BLC taking effect. 
  However, a primary drawback of these aggregate level studies lies in their 
inability to distinguish between lending responses resulting due to changes in loan 
demand or from the BLC through changes in the loan supply (Westerlund, 2003). 
Recent studies have hence increasingly used panel data models to study the BLC at the 
micro level. Panel data models tend to provide more accurate and precise estimates due 
to the extra time series observations they employ.  
  Developing on this, various bank level studies followed. The studies 
primarily attempted to distinguish banks based on asset size, capitalization, and 
liquidity. These studies attempted to show that bank lending was affected by monetary 
policy changes and that small, undercapitalized, and illiquid banks were most 
responsive and affected to that end. Most papers have supported the existence of a BLC, 
though the degree to which they agree upon its effectiveness varies. Using a panel of 
bank balance sheet data, Ehermann et. al. (2001), tested for the BLC in the Euro zone, 
and concluded that monetary policy does alter bank loan supply, and the effect is 
highly dependent on the individual bank’s liquidity. Working on similar lines, 
Westerlund (2003) tested for the BLC in Sweden for the period 1998-2003, using an 
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ARDL panel data model approach. Her conclusions supported the existence of an 
operational BLC in Sweden. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) developed on the work of 
Kashyap et al (1993, 1995, and 2000) for the US banking sector. They brought in an 
important element of globalization and studied its effect on US banking as well as the 
effect US monetary policy could have on other nations. Large globally oriented banks 
were shown to rely extensively on internal capital markets to smoothen domestic 
liquidity shocks. Even though they agreed upon its existence, they did conclude on the 
weakening of the BLC in US.  
  We attempt to add to this vast literature on the Bank Lending Channel of 
monetary policy transmission, using a panel of yearly disaggregated data on individual 
banks covering the period 1996-2007, for an emerging economy, India. We model the 
lending responses using dynamic panel data model. The paper aims to contribute in 
three primary ways: First, the paper can be viewed as the first work on studying the 
BLC in India2. Since India is one of the largest emerging economies with strong banking 
sector, a study of its banking behaviour and the effectiveness of its monetary policy 
provide the critical insight into the BLC hypothesis. Second, despite the comprehensive 
reforms, banking service in India remains highly regulated. Lending has always been 
viewed with particular interest and priority sector lending still remains legislated. We 
attempt to distinguish between priority and non-priority lending effects, simply 
because given its nature, inclusion of priority lending will only dilute the BLC. Finally, 
another distinguishing feature of this study is the methodology used. The paper 
recognizes the pro-cyclical lending behaviour and employs a dynamic panel data model 
to account for the lag effect in the lending behaviour. 
 
                                                            
2  The only other existing work which had examined the BLC in India for the period 1993‐94 to 2003‐04 is by Pundit 
et. al. (2006). However, their paper was done at the Department of Economic Analysis and Policy (RBI) mainly for 
in‐house usage. 
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The main findings reveal that monetary policy changes have a direct impact on bank 
lending and that these responses are more pronounced in the case of small banks. We 
also show that non-priority sector better supports the existence of a BLC, and that 
domestically-owned banks are more responsive to monetary policy changes. 
Specifically, the paper establishes the BLC in India; examines the dynamics between 
domestic and foreign banks as well as the dynamics between small and large banks and 
also differentiates the priority sector lending and non-priority sector lending.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows:  In section 2 we present the methodology 
and the estimation procedure used in the paper. Section 3 presents a brief description of 
the data. Section 4 contains the empirical findings of our model. Section 5, presents the 
conclusion. 
 
2. Methodology 
  In this section we outline the hypothesis that we are trying to test through 
an empirical model and explain the methodology used. The general model used for our 
estimation is: 
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  In equation 1, Lnit is the growth in loan supply captured by the total 
advances in the bank’s balance sheet. The variable has been constructed as the first 
difference of the logarithmic transformation of the loan supply. The main explanatory 
variable is PR, an exogenous variable, indicative of monetary policy shocks, or changes 
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in the prime policy rate (bank rate and repo rate). Thus, the variable PR captures the 
direct effect of changes in monetary policy on the growth rate of loan supply. The 
variable PR*BS_Strength captures the effect monetary policy has on the loan supply of a 
bank depending on the balance sheet strength of the bank. This variable interacts PR 
with a variable to account for the respective banks balance sheet strength. Here, the 
variables used to measure the balance sheet strength of the banks are liquidity and asset 
size. Liquidity is constructed as the ratio of bank liquid assets to total assets. Further, 
the variable is centered on its overall sample average after taking its logarithmic 
transformation. This makes the variable for balance sheet strength sum to zero across all 
banks. Asset size is constructed in a manner similar to liquidity by taking the total 
assets of the respective banks. Thus, the effect of PR*BS_Strength can be interpreted 
distinctly as an effect of policy change depending on the balance sheet strength of the 
bank. In most of our models, we have used liquidity, due to its statistical significance.  
  To account for movements in loan demand, most models are usually 
augmented with macroeconomic variables like GDP and other macro indices. However, 
because macroeconomic aggregates of this sort do not capture cross-sectional 
differences in lending opportunities, we instead include the growth of certificates of 
deposit (CD) and growth in securities (SEC). CD is the first difference of the logarithm 
of certificates of deposit and hence represents a measure of growth. SEC has been 
constructed on similar lines. The variable DUM is included to account for the 
incorporation of certain dummy variables in sub-sample models to obtain segment 
specific effects. 
  To test for an operational BLC we require the following conditions to be 
satisfied: (i) the estimated coefficient of PR should be less than zero (β < 0). This would 
imply that shifting to a tighter monetary policy regime reduces the growth rate of loan 
supply in the economy; (ii) the estimated coefficient on the interaction variable 
PR*BS_Strength should be positive (δ > 0) indicating that the effect of a policy change is 
more pronounced for the weaker banks (i.e. banks having liquidity or asset size lesser 
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than the mean sample liquidity or asset size), than on the stronger banks. Therefore, 
fulfillment of these two conditions is sufficient to prove the existence of BLC in India.  
  Most studies use a static model to study the dynamics of bank lending 
ignoring the pro-cyclic lending behavior. To this end Ln(-i) in equation 1 corrects the lag 
effect in the growth of loan supply.  
  Due to the presence of many panels and relatively few periods, we use the 
Arellano-Bover and Blundell-Bond system estimation for dynamic linear panel models. 
However, by construction, in this dynamic panel-data model in equation 1, the lagged 
dependent variables are correlated with the unobserved cross-sectional effects, making 
estimators inconsistent. Arellano-Bond (1991) developed a GMM method to estimate 
these models by using instruments to form the moment conditions. Moreover, Arellano-
Bond estimators become weak if the AR process is too persistent or ratio of the variance 
of the idiosyncratic error becomes too large. Therefore given the nature of our panel, we 
use Blundell and Bond (1998) system estimation for dynamic linear panel models. 
Blundell and Bond (1998) developed on the work of Arellano and Bover (1995), and 
proposed a system estimator. Finally, the validity of the empirical model used in the 
paper is established using the Sargan test. Under the test, the rejection of the null 
hypothesis justifies the validity of the instruments and the strength of the model.  
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3. DATA ANALYSIS 
  The individual bank balance sheet data used in this paper has been 
obtained from the Reserve Bank of India’s annual publication. Other macroeconomic 
data has been taken from the RBI’s handbook of statistics on the Indian economy. We 
use yearly data covering the period 1996 to 2007. The modeling universe encompasses a 
total of 96 banks, 8 belonging to the State Bank of India and associates group, 19 
nationalized banks, 35 other scheduled commercial banks, and 34 foreign banks. To 
account for the frenzied merger and acquisition activity witnessed by the banking sector 
after the initial reforms, we use an unbalanced panel data. Of the 96 banks, 57 enter the 
model in a balanced data framework, and the rest 37 are in an unbalanced form. The 
total number of observations used in the model is 999, which averages to just over 10 
years of data for each bank. Rural and cooperative banks have been omitted from our 
analysis, owing to the fact that their lending responses aren’t the same as other 
commercial banks and are legislatively crafted, rather than market determined.   
  Lending by banks initially captures all the loans disbursed by the 
respective banks in the particular financial year; however for further analysis we also 
distinguish priority sector lending from non-priority sector lending. Banks’ liquid asset 
is defined as sum of cash in hand and balances with RBI and money at call and short 
notice. Asset size is the total assets as captured by the individual bank’s balance sheet. 
Due to the policy regime shift adopted by the RBI in 2002, the Repo rate has been used 
as the effective policy rate for the period 2002-2007, while the bank rate has been used 
for the earlier period (1996-2002). Bank Rate can be defined as the interest rate charged 
by the RBI on loans to commercial banks. It is mainly used by the RBI to influence the 
rates that commercial banks offer on loans to businesses and consumers. In India, the 
Bank Rate had been used as the prime policy rate till 2002, and now the Repo Rate is 
used as the prime policy rate3. The Repo Rate refers to the rate at which the banks can 
borrow from the RBI against approved securities. Figure 3.2 gives a brief idea about the 
                                                            
3 The bank rate has been fixed at 6% 
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relationship seen between prime policy rates and the total loan supply by the banks in 
the sample. Fig 3.2a demonstrates this for the bank rate regime, and Fig 3.2b does the 
same for the Repo Rate regime. We observe a very well pronounced inverse relation 
between the bank rate and loan supply. However, this inverse relation seems to have 
weakened after the adoption of the repo rate as the prime policy rate. 
 
  Figure 3.1 demonstrates the highly skewed nature of our data. Even though the 
banking sector has undergone comprehensive reforms, and seen a wave of 
deregulation, over 80% of the loan supply in the economy has been offered by big 
banks(Fig 3.1a), i.e., banks with an asset base greater than the sample average asset base 
in that particular year.   
 
 
 
Figure 3.1a: Percentage of total loans supplied by big banks 
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 Figure 3.1b: Average asset size across banks (in Crores of rupees) 
 
There is also a particularly large gap between the small and the big banks as seen 
through Fig 3.1b. The average asset size here is defined as the average of the asset base 
of the respective bank for its respective sample period. The average asset base could be 
seen as a proxy for the power that lies in the hands of the respective banks. Going by 
this notation, over 80% of the market power is controlled by the top quartile of the 
banks (by average asset size).  
 
Figure 3.2a: Bank Rate Regime 
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 Figure 3.2b: Repo Rate Regime 
 
   
  Table 3.1 presents a power profile of the top 10 banks in India, based on 
loan disbursements for the last two sample periods. The numbers in parenthesis 
reported in Table3.1 represent bank’s market shares in that particular year. These 10 
banks have consistently controlled over 55% of the industry’s total loan disbursements 
as well as the asset base. Expectedly enough, only two private banks feature in this list, 
and these two happen to be the only ones recording an average yearly growth rate well 
above the industry growth rate for the period 1996 to 2007. It should be noted that these 
two banks began only in the year 1995-96, clearly indicating their edge over public-
sector banks.  
 
 
 
 
  12
 Table 3.1: Profile of top 10 banks in India 
Bank Name 
Average 
Asset Base Total Advances M & A 
Avg. Annual 
Growth rate 
  1996-2007 1996 2001 2007 
1991-
2007 1996-2007 
SBI 26195905 5982565 11359027 33733649 NA 17.32% 
  (0.1949) (0.2394) (0.2188) (0.1776)     
ICICI 
BANK*** 8810178 65075 703146 19586560 1 96.04% 
  (0.0655) (0.0026) (0.0135) (0.1031)     
CANARA 
BANK 6151319 1309584 2783177 9850569 NA 20.26% 
  (0.0458) (0.0524) (0.0536) (0.0519)     
PNB 6345776 1267989 2802905 9659652 2 20.40% 
  (0.0472) (0.0507) (0.054) (0.0509)     
BANK OF 
BARODA 5868217 1601255 2742068 8362087 3 16.87% 
  (0.0437) (0.0641) (0.0528) (0.044)     
BANK OF 
INDIA 5834680 1559580 3182314 8493590 1 16.91% 
  (0.0434) (0.0624) (0.0613) (0.0447)     
UNION 
BANK OF 
INDIA 3820563 868108 1750535 6238643 NA 19.98% 
  (0.0284) (0.0347) (0.0337) (0.0329)     
CENTRAL 
BANK OF 
INDIA 4103232 890257 1883338 5179547 NA 18.02% 
  (0.0305) (0.0356) (0.0363) (0.0273)     
HDFC 
BANK*** 2718032 36862 463666 4694478 1 57.48% 
  (0.0202) (0.0015) (0.0089) (0.0247)     
SYNDICATE 
BANK 2935503 539766 1311616 5167044 NA 23.36% 
  (0.0218) (0.0216) (0.0253) (0.0272)     
Sample total 72783406 14121041 28981792 110965819 8   
Industry total 134428520.4 24987609 51925566 189904579 14   
Market Power 54.143% 56.512% 55.814% 58.432%     
Industry 
Growth Rate            18% 
     
  13
  The banking sector has witnessed over 14 mergers/ amalgamations in the 
domestic scheduled commercial banks, involving some of India’s largest private banks 
like HDFC, UTI (now Axis) and ICICI. It is noteworthy, that 8 out of the 14 mergers 
took place within these top10 banks and of the 8 only 2 were in the private sector. 
Sample statistics also point to the fact that the bottom half of the banking sector 
controlled just over 5% of the credit in India during 2007. Drawing from the profile of 
the top 10 banks, it is not likely that this 5% figure has changed much during our 
sample period.  
  The next section analyzes the BLC in detail. These preliminary 
observations provide further insight into the empirical analysis presented in the next 
section. 
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4. Empirical Results 
  In this section we present the empirical findings of our BLC hypothesis. 
We begin by examining the effect of monetary action on total loan disbursements by 
banks, followed by a close examination of the lending behvoiur for the priority versus 
non-priority sectors. We then explore the differential impact of the BLC on public and 
private sector banks, and also on small and large banks. Finally, we study the dynamics 
between domestic and foreign banks.  
  Ideally, when the central bank in any country adopts a contractionary 
policy stand, the economy experiences a fall in money balances primarily through fall in 
lending by the financial institutions or banks in the country. Expectedly enough, big 
banks due to their reserves of other assets/ securities and power to issue greater 
amounts of CD’s are able to preempt this liquidity shock as compared to small banks.  
 
 
TABLE 4.1: Loan Supply dynamics in event of Monetary Policy changes 
 
An unbalanced panel of 92 banks in India from the RBI database has been used. The sample 
period is 1996-2007. The dependent variable in the model is current period growth in loan 
supply.   A dynamic panel-data estimation technique has been used.  
 
Ln Coef. Std. Err. P>z 95% Conf. Interval 
Ln(-1) 0.0131*** 0.00097 0.00000 0.01123 0.01504 
PR -0.0096*** 0.00081 0.00000 -0.01123 -0.00807 
PR(-1) -0.0107*** 0.00057 0.00000 -0.01186 -0.00962 
PR*Liq .0867*** 0.00217 0.00000 0.08239 0.09091 
CD .1527*** 0.00183 0.00000 0.14916 0.15632 
_cons .0339*** 0.00075 0.00000 0.03237 0.03533 
Sargan chi2(63) 84.94911    
Test Prob > chi2 0.0341    
                ***=significant as 1% level; **=significant at 3%; *=significant at 5% 
 
)1.4(0867.00096.0 KKLiq
PR
Ln +−=δ
δ
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  Table 4.1 presents the estimates for the total loan supply. All the variables 
included in the model are significant. The one period lag of loan supply has a positive 
and significant impact on the current period loan supply, justifying our choice of a 
dynamic estimation framework. The estimates clearly demonstrate the effect monetary 
policy has on loan supply, and its differential impact based on balance sheet strength. 
As hypothesized, the coefficients of policy rate and the one period lag of policy rate are 
both negative, implying a contractionary monetary policy (increase in bank rate or repo 
rate) will reduce the supply of credit in the economy. The ‘PR*Liq’ variable helps to 
understand the effect of monetary policy on individual banks loan supply depending 
on their balance sheet strength as shown through the respective banks liquidity. 
Importantly, the estimated coefficient on this variable is positive. It implies that banks 
with liquidity greater than the mean sample liquidity are less affected by monetary 
actions than other banks. From equation 4.1, we see that when a bank’s liquidity is 
lower than the mean sample liquidity (Liq<0), the effect of a monetary action is 
amplified, on the other hand, stronger banks (Liq>0) are able to cushion the impact. 
Growth in CD has a positive and significant impact on growth of loan supply. Given the 
construction of the respective variables, it implies that a 1% growth in CDs results in a 
0.15% growth in loan supply. CD enters the model to account for cross-sectional 
differences in funding opportunities that vary across individual banks, and provides for 
a good substitute for other macroeconomic variables that may be included to control for 
loan demand effects.  
  Therefore, table 4.1 evidently shows the existence of a BLC in the total 
loan supply behavior. Post estimation Sargan tests reveal that the model is correctly 
specified. Further, in India, the government and RBI have tried to use the banking 
sector to its advantage in terms of achieving equitable growth and serving credit to the 
under-privileged sections of the economy. All banks, domestic and foreign, are required 
to provide a fixed percentage of their total loan disbursements to the ‘priority-sector’ in 
India. Priority sector can thus be claimed to be legislatively governed, and banks have 
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little choice with respect to this. Therefore, we attempt to break-up bank lending into 
two parts, priority sector lending, and non-priority sector lending. 
 
 
TABLE 4.2: Loan Supply dynamics in event of Monetary Policy changes: Priority 
Sector vs. Non-Priority Sector lending 
An unbalanced panel of 92 banks in India from the RBI database has been used. The sample 
period is 1996-2007. A dynamic panel-data estimation technique has been used. The dependent 
variable in the model is current period growth in loan supply to priority sectors and non-
priority sectors respectively, respectively. 
  
Priority Sector Non-Priority Sector 
 
Ln Coef. Std. Err. P>z Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
Ln(-1) -0.09742*** 0.00059 0.00000 -0.21547*** 0.00044 0.00000 
PR -0.00754*** 0.00142 0.00000 -0.01507*** 0.00095 0.00000 
PR(-1) -0.01574*** 0.00123 0.00000 -0.03025*** 0.00113 0.00000 
PR  * Liq -0.15345*** 0.00309 0.00000 0.16838*** 0.00260 0.00000 
CD 0.25480*** 0.00208 0.00000 0.19011*** 0.00302 0.00000 
Const 0.04392*** 0.00097 0.00000 0.02793*** 0.00131 0.00000 
Sargan chi2(63)   79.9046 chi2(63)   82.6343 
Test Prob > chi2 0.0739 Prob > chi2 0.0492 
***=significant as 1% level; **=significant at 3%; *=significant at 5% 
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  Further, given the nature in which the priority sector lending is governed 
in India, we expect a weak BLC for priority sector lending. Table 4.2 and equations 4.2 
(priority sector) and 4.3 (non-priority sector) show the estimates obtained for 
disaggregated (priority and non priority) lending. We see a stronger BLC operating in 
non-priority sector lending. Both, the direct effect of change in monetary policy on the 
loan supply, as well as the effect of monetary policy depending on the balance sheet 
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strength of the banks is greater in non-priority sector lending. Weak banks tend to 
decrease lending to non-priority sectors at a faster rate than to priority sectors in a 
policy tightening regime. On the other hand, strong banks increase lending to non-
priority sectors at a faster rate than to priority sectors in a less stringent policy regime. It 
is important to note the difference between equation 4.1 and 4.3. In comparison to 
equation 4.1 we see that there is a stronger BLC in operation when we consider only 
non-priority sector lending than when we consider total lending. This happens 
particularly in the Indian case since priority sector lending tends to dilute the BLC. 
Given our findings in the above case, we consider only the non-priority sector lending 
for all our further analysis.   
 
 
TABLE 4.3: Loan Supply dynamics in event of Monetary Policy changes: Public vs. 
Private Sector Banks 
An unbalanced panel of 92 banks in India from the RBI database has been used. The 
sample period is 1996-2007. A dynamic panel-data estimation technique has been used. 
The dependent variable in the model is current period growth in loan supply. To view 
the differential impact of policy on public and privates sector banks, appropriate binary 
variables have been used. The binary variable Private takes the value 1 for observations 
that belong to private banks and 0 otherwise.  
Ln Coef. Std. Err. P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
Ln (-1) -0.20939*** 0.00080 0.00000 -0.21095 -0.20783 
PR -0.01720*** 0.00313 0.00000 -0.02334 -0.01107 
PR (-1) -0.02782*** 0.00171 0.00000 -0.03118 -0.02447 
PR * Liq  -0.00818 0.01717 0.63400 -0.04184 0.02548 
Private 0.11888*** 0.01951 0.00000 0.08064 0.15712 
Private* PR   0.00466 0.00361 0.19600 -0.00241 0.01174 
Private*PR*Liq 0.24749*** 0.01695 0.00000 0.21427 0.28071 
CD 0.17193*** 0.00432 0.00000 0.16347 0.18039 
Const -0.03561* 0.01820 0.05000 -0.07128 0.00006 
Sargan Test chi2(57) = 68.18062     
  Prob > chi2 = 0.1475     
***=significant as 1% level; **=significant at 3%; *=significant at 5% 
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Table 4.3 analyzes the differential impact of policy actions on public sector banks vis-à-
vis private sector banks. The binary variable Private takes the value one for observations 
that belong to private banks and zero otherwise. Interaction terms have been created to 
account for the differential impact of policy on public and private banks. Equation 4.4 
(public sector) and 4.5 (private sector) summarize the results presented in table 4.3. The 
impact of policy on lending by public and private sectors banks is similar. This is seen 
through the insignificant coefficient of Private*PR. However, in the case of private sector 
banks, policy actions tend to affect weaker banks more than the stronger ones. This can 
be explained by the fact that most public sector banks are large banks and hence we do 
not see a differential impact of policy actions. We therefore try to study the differential 
impact of policy on small versus large banks in our next analysis.    
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TABLE 4.4: Loan Supply dynamics in event of Monetary Policy changes: Small Banks 
vs. Large Banks 
An unbalanced panel of 92 banks in India from the RBI database has been used. The 
sample period is 1996-2007. A dynamic panel-data estimation technique has been used. 
The dependent variable in the model is current period growth in loan supply. To view 
the differential impact of policy on small and large banks, appropriate binary variables 
have been used. The binary variable Size_Dummy takes the value 1 for observations that 
belong to small banks and 0 otherwise. 
Ln Coef. Std. Err. P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Ln(-1) -0.20986*** 0.00090 0.00000 -0.21162 -0.20810
PR -0.02674*** 0.00557 0.00000 -0.03767 -0.01582
PR(-1) -0.02806*** 0.00209 0.00000 -0.03216 -0.02396
PR*Liq -0.03975 0.02148 0.06400 -0.08185 0.00235
Size_Dummy 0.04499*** 0.01156 0.00000 0.02233 0.06765
PR*Size_Dummy 0.01881*** 0.00600 0.00200 0.00705 0.03058
PR*Liq*Size_Dummy0.24790*** 0.02328 0.00000 0.20227 0.29354
CD 0.16700*** 0.00357 0.00000 0.16001 0.17399
Const 0.00339 0.01104 0.75900 -0.01824 0.02502
Sargan Test chi2(54) = 69.99043    
  Prob > chi2 = 0.0706    
 ***=significant as 1% level; **=significant at 3%; *=significant at 5% 
 
 
)7.4(20815.000793.0
)6.4(02674.0
arg
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KKKKKKK
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δ
δ
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  To account for the size we have constructed a new binary variable Size 
Dummy, which takes the value 1 if the bank is a small bank, i.e., does not fall into the 
top quartile of the asset distribution of the firms in that particular year, and zero 
otherwise. A negative and significant co-efficient on PR*Liq indicate that the large 
banks do not get affected differently by monetary action depending on their balance 
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sheet strength, though tight monetary policy tend to reduce their loan portfolio 
(equation 4.6). On the other hand, an effective BLC is witnessed within the small banks 
as seen through equation 4.7. Interestingly, the estimates from the public vs. private 
sector banks, and the estimates from the small vs. large banks follow similar trends. 
This can be attributed to the fact that most large banks are public sector banks.  
 
TABLE 4.5: Loan Supply dynamics in event of Monetary Policy changes: Domestic vs. 
Foreign Banks 
An unbalanced panel of 92 banks in India from the RBI database has been used. The 
sample period is 1996-2007. A  dynamic panel-data estimation technique has been used. 
The dependent variable in the model is current period growth in loan supply. The 
binary variable Foreign takes the value 1 for observations that belong to foreign banks 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
Ln Coef. 
Std. 
Err. P>z 
[95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Ln(-1) -0.2236*** 0.0006 0.0000 -0.2249 -0.2224 
PR -0.0297*** 0.0020 0.0000 -0.0336 -0.0258 
PR (-1) -0.0270*** 0.0014 0.0000 -0.0298 -0.0241 
PR*Liq 0.0733*** 0.0111 0.0000 0.0515 0.0951 
CD 0.1690*** 0.0040 0.0000 0.1612 0.1769 
Foreign 0.3901*** 0.0117 0.0000 0.3672 0.4130 
PR*Foreign 0.0520*** 0.0021 0.0000 0.0479 0.0561 
PR*Liq*Foreign 0.1313*** 0.0111 0.0000 0.1094 0.1531 
Const -0.0842*** 0.0089 0.0000 -0.1017 -0.0667 
***=significant as 1% level; **=significant at 3%; *=significant at 5% 
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  Given that India’s banking sector has undergone a structural 
change and there is an increasing presence of foreign banks in the country, it is 
imperative to study the behavior of foreign banks within the economy. In order to 
analyze the behavior of the foreign banks we have created a binary variable ‘Foreign’ 
which takes the value 1 if the observation belongs to a foreign bank and zero otherwise. 
Further, PR*Foreign represents the interaction variable between the change in policy rate 
and the binary variable Foreign. This variable shows the differential impact policy rate 
has on foreign banks vis-à-vis domestic banks.  
  Equation 4.8 (domestic banks) and equation 4.9 (foreign banks) 
summarize the effects of policy changes on loan supply. Firstly the direct impact of 
changes in policy is more pronounced in case of domestic banks as opposed to the 
impact on foreign banks. Owing to the presence of well-built internal capital markets, 
and the vast economies of scale they enjoy, foreign banks are able to shift resources 
from one country to another, allowing them to deftly dampen the effects of domestic 
liquidity shocks. Secondly, stronger foreign banks are less sensitive to policy actions as 
compared to stronger domestic banks, while weak foreign banks are more sensitive to 
policy changes than weak domestic banks. This clearly points to the fact that a stronger 
BLC operates within the domestic banking sector.  
  Finally to avoid the arbitrariness involved in our sub sample analysis, an 
endogenous liquidity threshold analysis is carried out on an extended sample. In the 
threshold model, as developed by Hansen (2000), we specify a regression equation and 
a threshold variable. Depending upon the regression, the program finds a threshold 
value for the specified threshold variable. This value attempts to optimally divide the 
sample into two distinct groups experiencing markedly different impacts on the 
dependent variable in the specified model as well as a point where there is a break in 
the threshold variable. Here, we attempt to divide the sample into two multiple groups 
based on the liquidity of the banks. In this model, the panels are pooled into one cross-
sectional analysis augmented with additional observations, by extending the sample to 
1991. 
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 TABLE 4.6: Loan Supply dynamics in event of Monetary Policy changes:  Threshold 
Regression Estimates  
Threshold Variable 
log (liquid assets/ 
total assets) 
Threshold Estimate 0.349092 
.95 Confidence Interval [0.346649,0.349092] 
Sum of Squared Errors 37.324755 
Residual Variance 0.031956 
Joint R-squared 0.187470 
Heteroscedasticity test (p-value) 0.000000 
  Global OLS Regime 1 Regime 2 
Ln 
Without 
Threshold liquidity<=0.349092 Liquidity>.349092 
PR -0.020043*** -0.009172*** 0.22383*** 
PR (-1) -0.002629 -0.011264*** -0.014458*** 
Liquidity*PR 0.217428*** 0.196234*** -0.39012*** 
CD 0.362298*** 0.507864 0.039612*** 
Const 0.048623*** 0.044044 -0.072811*** 
Observations 1178 1111 67 
Sum of Squared Errors 40.29410 26.00795 11.31681 
Residual Variance 0.03435 0.02352 0.18253 
R-squared 0.12283 0.21416 0.01334 
***=significant as 1% level; **=significant at 3%; *=significant at 5% 
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Figure 4.1: Confidence Interval Construction for 
Threshold
 
The estimates from a threshold model are presented in table 4.6. The threshold variable 
used is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the banks liquid assets to total assets. The 
threshold value obtained is 0.349092 which divides the sample into two groups with 6% 
of the observations falling into the higher liquidity category. Thus, table4.6 establishes 
that banks within the lesser liquidity group are more affected by policy rate changes, 
although the lagged effect of policy on both the groups is similar. Further, within the 
group comprising of less liquid banks, the relatively stronger banks are less prone to  
the BLC effect as indicated by the positive and significant co-efficient on the interaction 
variable (PR*Liq) in table 4.6. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
The study establishes the existence of an operational Bank Lending Channel for 
monetary transmission in India. Specifically, the result shows that monetary policy 
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changes have a direct impact on bank lending and these responses are more 
pronounced in case of small banks. The paper also reveals that the non-priority sector 
better supports the existence of a BLC, and that domestically owned banks are more 
responsive to monetary policy changes. Our results have certain important implications 
for the conduct and effectiveness of monetary policy: First, the results clearly point to 
the fact that monetary actions have little effect on large banks, and since these large 
banks control a major portion of the lending in India, policy effectiveness and 
transmission could be moderate4. Measures to check inflation and the supply of output 
through police rates changes may not be highly effective. 
Second, since large banks are able to insulate themselves from monetary and liquidity 
shocks, formation of even larger banks through M&A activity should be advocated with 
cautions. As banks grow bigger, the autonomy they enjoy is huge, and the control of the 
Central Bank over their lending policy weans. Of the 14 mergers in our sample, 8 took 
place within the top 10 banks. Formation of overtly larger banks, through the merger of 
large banks, will only hinder effective policy action.  
                                                            
4 This is little contradictory, due to the fact that , since most large banks in India are state‐owned,  some kind of 
ideological evenness between them can be expected. Despite this, we see a very weak lending channel in large 
banks. 
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